Are we headed for another coup? (Part I)

By Tawanda Majoni | Sep. 1, 2024

These chaps will burst each other any time; but let them do it, we don’t quite care about it. That’s what you will hear in the dark corners of the dingy pubs.

This season we are living in, it’s not a time for a hairdo. People are perching on the edge of the cliff.

There is a loud whisper drifting around, almost like a wish among many. These chaps will burst each other any time; but let them do it, we don’t quite care about it. That’s what you will hear in the dark corners of the dingy pubs.

They are referring to the gory succession politics in Zanu PF, which, on the unwritten rule, also interchanges with the government. Let’s put it more directly. Many people feel and think that there will be another coup in Zimbabwe.

Here is the thing. President Emmerson Mnangagwa has on two occasions said that he will not extend his tenure in office beyond 2028 when his second term expires because that would be against the constitution. But even then, not many people are taking his word.

That’s because the Zanu PF structures — well, the dominant faction and kowtowers thereof — are keeping on with the slogan that says Mnangagwa must be in power beyond 2028. Inadvertently, they are acknowledging that the president, who replaced the late Robert Mugabe through the 2017 coup, is moving too slowly with his agenda such that he would need more time to do so after 2028.

Yet, on the hand, there seems to be a Zanu PF camp that hates that talk with a passion. This camp has been linked to Mnangagwa’s deputy, Constantino Chiwenga, who led the 2017 power transfer as commander of the Defence Forces.

They are crying betrayal. We have heard for quite a while now that this camp wanted Mnangagwa to hand over the reins to Chiwenga even before the expiry of the former’s first term between 2018 and 2023.

This reported standoff between the two coup masters is what is giving space to the feeling that there could be a coup any time.

Keep Reading

In essence, there is suspicion that Chiwenga will lead a coup against Mnangagwa so that he can get his chance to rule and chow with chosen eaters.

In the main, two things have fed that speculation quite generously.

Unlike most of the people in the Zanu PF and government structures, Chiwenga has not endorsed the Vision 2030 slogan that is being used to moblise for Mnangagwa to stay post-2028.

Secondly, and very tellingly, Chiwenga has spoken with a twisted tongue to apparently condemn the 2030 campaign.

Just recently, he said people must not owe their allegiance to individuals but Zanu PF and Zimbabwe.

Those individuals, when interpreted in the court of public opinion, are Mnangagwa, Mnangagwa and Mnangagwa.

The logical thinking, then, is: If Chiwenga led a coup back then, he will lead a coup again if he is not too happy with the king.

Never mind the fallacy in that, the argument still makes sense. And, quite interestingly, there are so many rastas out there who believe that the army will any time from now do a Mugabe on Mnangagwa, in favour of Chiwenga.

We will talk about this in two different breaths. This week, let’s try to get a firm understanding of the factors and conditions that aided the 2017 coup.

That way, we will then be able to decide whether or not Zimbabwe will see another coup any time in the near-to-not-so-distant future. There is this simplistic and pretty myopic thinking that the 2017 coup was possible because the army, then led by Chiwenga, wanted and decided to do it. The truth, though, is that Chiwenga and his army might have wanted a coup as much as the Chiadzwa diamonds but it would not have succeeded if that wish and plan were not enabled by other compelling factors.

Mugabe’s overstay in power was one of the leading issues that motivated and inspired the coup. The internal — that is within Zanu PF — and external resentment around Mugabe’s drawn-out stay in power started developing seriously from the late 1990s. That was when Zimbabwe’s economic and political fortunes started plummeting.

The likes of the late general, Solomon Mujuru, increasingly got frustrated with him because he was hurting their commercial and political interests, especially as they related to global dynamics following the introduction of sanctions at the turn of the millennium.

Mujuru led a Zanu PF faction fronted by his wife, Joice, that pushed both overtly and covertly for Mugabe’s removal, culminating in the political sabotage or “bhora musango” of 2008 towards that year’s elections when they prodded Simba Makoni to form the ill-fated Mavambo party.

Of course, by the time of the coup, the Mujuru faction had been weakened when Joice was removed as VP in 2014 to make way for Mnangagwa and camp loyalists like Rugare Gumbo and Didymus Mutasa sent running for cover.

But what you can’t take away is the fact that the Mujuru faction had a huge following in Zanu PF, so there was critical resentment of Mugabe in Team Gamatox, as the Mujuru camp got to be known.

There is a telling irony, though. The very architects of the 2017 coup, chief among them Mnangagwa and Chiwenga, seem to have privately hated Mugabe’s continued stay in power, but publicly and practically supported his rule.

Mnangagwa, in particular, felt it was his turn to take over from the aged Mugabe. But, in order for his dream to come true, it was necessary to keep Mugabe in the chair till the opportune time.

However, the longer Mugabe loitered in power without anointing him a successor but instead played his camp against Mnangagwa’s rivals that came to be known as G-40, the more precarious it became for the current president’s power plans.

Number two, the army factor.

In retrospect, the military-assisted power takeover from Mugabe is something that took a long time in planning before execution in November 2017.

Clearly, Mnangagwa and Chiwenga shared the same vision of having Mugabe removed. Especially on the eve of the coup when the G-40 that incorporated Grace Mugabe became increasingly publicly critical of the army.

So, there was this hugely useful readiness in the army to pressure Mugabe out. It was of particular value that Chiwenga was the CDF. He had enough power and influence to rally most of the military in favour of Mugabe’s removal.

The rank and file in the military, even if it may not have liked the idea, had no choice but to follow orders.

But then, the rank and file had already started what looked like a rebellion because of frustration caused by the economic hardships during Mugabe’s rule.

You will remember the shop lootings and the raid at the farm of then governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe by low-ranked soldiers as hyperinflation turned gunners’ salaries into trash paper, which they were battling to get from the banks, anyway.

In a way, the army was generally united against Mugabe. Fine, the likes of Perrance Shiri, then in charge of the air force, were somewhat shifty.

Shiri, as you will remember, was strategically absent from the then KGVI Barracks presser when Chiwenga announced the military’s frustration with the political situation in the country a few days before the coup.

Thirdly, the external factor. There are anecdotal indications that some powerful countries like China and Britain favoured Mugabe’s removal. There is some rhyme in that. When Chiwenga called the press conference at the now Josiah Magama Tongogara Barracks in Harare, he had just returned from China. The coincidence is informative.

And Mugabe had just kicked out major Chinese miners like Anjin and Jinan out of the lucrtaive Marange diamond fields. He had previously complained bitterly about Chinese dishonesty in the so-called mega-deals.

Britain was among the first to embrace the post-coup administration, most probably because it loathed Mugabe for his perennial anti-British rhetoric. Mugabe had become intensely unpopular locally, regionally and internationally because of political misrule, corruption and human rights abuses. Millions of Zimbabweans didn’t like him.

Sadc saw him as a burden and the local opposition would do anything at its disposal to have him out.

That is why it led the impeachment process against Mugabe. Ever wondered why Sadc never condemned the coup? The West and East had also basically become united against Mugabe.

Number five, political laxity. Mugabe was regularly briefed on the intentions and actions of the Lacoste movement.

Even G40 players like Jonathan Moyo were well aware of what was happening and warned Mugabe.

Ironically, though, they seemed not to believe their own fears because they, instead, went home to sleep soundly.

The issue is that, mainly, they never believed that Team Lacoste had the capacity to do a coup.

Mugabe later said he feared a bloodbath, considering that the army was heavily involved, but that sounds like a political statement because he could have gone ahead and reshuffled the army well in time.

When they tried to arrest Chiwenga at the airport upon his return from China, the horses had already bolted.

Then there was Mugabe’s age and his judgmental competence. This could partly explain the political laxity.

Already in his mid-90s, Mugabe’s judgment had become severely impaired and the excitable but politically blunder-some Grace had practically taken over.

He couldn’t adequately comprehend the implications of what was taking place.

Number seven, the coup plotters enjoyed not only military backing but the ability to moblise the Zanu PF party structures.

Mnangagwa had been in Zanu PF for a very long time and enjoyed lots of traction in the ruling party, having managed to incorporate many provincial chairpersons and other influential party leaders.

This combined well with the fact that the Mujuru loyalists had already made up their minds against Mugabe.

This would prove useful when the army used military precision to whip up popular sentiment in favour of the coup.

In addition, Team Lacoste had managed to infiltrate the intelligence structures in the security sector, to the extent that it didn’t help Mugabe in any way that the head of CIO, Happyton Bonyongwe, and police boss, Augustine Chihuri, were fighting from his corner.

*Tawanda Majoni writes in his personal capacity and can be contacted on majonitt@gmail.com